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ABSTRACT In smart cities, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) act as a type of core infrastructure that collects
data from the city to implement smart services. The security of WSNs is one of the key issues of smart cities.
In resource-restrained WSNs, dynamic ongoing or unknown attacks usually steer clear of isolated defense
components. Therefore, to resolve this problem, we propose a hierarchical framework based on chance
discovery and usage control (UCON) technologies to improve the security of WSNs while still taking the
low-complexity and high security requirements of WSNs into account. The features of continuous decision
and dynamic attributes in UCON can address ongoing attacks using advanced persistent threat detection.
In addition, we use a dynamic adaptive chance discovery mechanism to detect unknown attacks. To design
and implement a system using the mechanism described above, a unified framework is proposed in which
low-level attack detection with simple rules is performed in sensors, and high-level attack detection with
complex rules is performed in sinks and at the base station. Moreover, software-defined networking and
network function virtualization technologies are used to perform attack mitigation when either low-level or
high-level attacks are detected. An experiment was performed to acquire an attack data set for evaluation.
Then, a simulation was created to evaluate the resource consumption and attack detection rate. The results
demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed scheme.
INDEX TERMS Smart city, wireless sensor networks (WSNs), chance discovery, attack detection, software-
defined networking.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) can act as one type of
core smart city infrastructure [1]–[4]. Smart grids, smart
transportation, smart government and so on can all be realized
using WSNs. Moreover, the sensed data can also support
additional smart city services. Therefore, the security of
WSNs is a key issue for smart cities. Because WSNs are
often deployed in potentially adverse or even hostile envi-
ronments, an attacker can generate all types of threats and
attacks [5]–[10]. In addition to traditional threats, there is the
possibility for advanced persistent threats, which are sophis-
ticated ongoing and unknown attacks in WSNs [11], [12].
Most existing WSN security components do not include
mutable attributes; therefore, traditional security components
cannot defend against ongoing attacks with dynamically
changing features. In addition, in typical intrusion detection
or prevention systems, unknown attacks are regarded as novel
attacks because they always contain novel characteristics,
which differ from those of traditional attacks. Because most
existing intrusion or attack prevention systems in WSNs are
built using training samples of known threats, they cannot
defend against unknown attacks that can compromise the
WSNs. In short, the advanced persistent threats formed
by ongoing and unknown attacks can break into WSNs
and disrupt their normal tasks. Hence, it is critical to pro-
pose an attack prevention scheme that can enhance security
for WSNs.
There are security mechanisms already in use in some
existing applications such as VoIP enterprise environments,
trust management, web services, and so on that were
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developed to address various types of attacks including
ongoing and unknown attacks [13]–[15]. However, these
schemes cannot be used directly in WSNs.
Currently, two complementary types of defense approaches
exist to protect WSNs: detection-based approaches, such as
intrusion detection (ID), and prevention-based method, such
as access control. Althoughmany security schemes have been
proposed to address intrusion detection and access control
for WSNs [5]–[10], these two types of approaches have
traditionally been studied separately. To improve the security
of WSNs, we propose a security framework in this paper
that combines attack detection and access control. Moreover,
unlike traditional prevention methods in WSNs [5], [6],
the proposed framework employs usage control (UCON)
with continuous decision making and dynamic attributes.
These two features are helpful in defending against ongoing
threats. In addition—and also different from most exist-
ing detection methods [6]–[10]—we consider a hierarchical
attack detection scheme based on chance discovery, which
can update dynamically to defend against unknown attacks.
Finally, software-defined networking (SDN) and network
function virtualization (NFV) are used to perform attack
mitigations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Sect. II describes the network architecture and preliminaries.
Sect. III explains the basic ideas behind the hierarchical
security framework. Sect. IV presents the design principles of
the proposed attack detection mechanism. Sect. V describes
the attack mitigation mechanism. Sect. VI describes the
experiment to acquire the attack data set. Sect. VII describes
the evaluation. Finally, Sect. VIII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. ACCESS DECISION-MAKING ARCHITECTURE
The three-layer network architectures generally used for
WSNs [16], [17] include a base station (BS), sink and sensors.
There are two main methods for performing data storage
in WSNs: distributed methods and centralized methods [18].
The distributed method stores sensed data locally in the
sensors, while the centralized scheme sends sensed data from
the sensors to the sink.
When users access a WSN, the access point (AP) can be
at the BS, at a sink, or at a sensor. Because WSNs are usu-
ally deployed in unprotected environments, having a robust
security scheme for WSNs is imperative for preventing or
defending against attacks, especially ongoing and unknown
attacks [11], [12].
B. CHANCE DISCOVERY THEORY
Chance discovery theory [19], proposed by
Yukio Ohsawa et. al., is intended to use chance discovery
to detect attacks. In chance discovery theory, a chance can be
regarded as any event or situation that has a significant impact
on decision making. This theory goes beyond the area of data
mining; the purpose of chance discovery is to understand the
meaning of rare events to help users make decisions to protect
the system from risks.
There are some existing algorithms for realizing chance
discovery. The KeyGraph algorithm [20], proposed by
Yukio Ohsawa et. al., is a typical method for implementing
chance discovery. KeyGraph extracts key points from the
data and then maps the relations among those points as an
intuitionistic graph. The lines between the nodes in KeyGraph
denote relationships among the data and can then quantify the
amount of ‘‘tightness’’ between the objects.
C. USAGE CONTROL
The next-generation access control model, usage con-
trol (UCON), is a new type of prevention technology. In con-
trast to normal access control methods, UCON performs data
control not only at the time of access but also during and after
use [21]. Continuous decisions with regard to data access can
be made before the access is allowed, during a user’s session,
or even (via an event) after the session ends. Additionally,
its attributes can be updated before access is granted, during
use, or after usage has been authorized. Through this type
of continuous control, the security level can be substantially
improved. Many additional security capabilities, such as data
rights management (DRM), can also be performed. A visual
depiction of usage control is shown in Fig. 1. The dynamic
attribute is on of the most important issues of UCON.
FIGURE 1. Usage control.
D. SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING AND NETWORK
FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION TECHNOLOGIES
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel technology
intended to provide network operators with more flexibility
in programming their networks, and there are few in the net-
working community who have escaped its impact [22]–[25].
Network function virtualization (NFV) is another new tech-
nology that aids in performing network management effec-
tively. NFV enables network devices to be deployed as
virtualized components via software.
E. SOPHISTICATED ATTACKS
In this paper, we consider two types of sophisticated attacks
on defense systems in WSNs, both of which can form
advanced persistent threats.
1) DYNAMIC ONGOING ATTACKS
These attacks usually have dynamically changing features
(i.e., wireless MAC address) and can steer clear of the
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traditional defense components in WSNs because mutable
attributes have not been considered in traditional defense
components.
2) UNKNOWN ATTACKS
For intrusion detection or prevention systems, unknown
attacks can be regarded as novel attacks. Unknown attacks
have quite different characteristics compared with typical
attacks. Because most existing intrusion detection or preven-
tion systems in WSNs are designed based on existing rule
sets drawn from previous attacks, the systems cannot detect
unknown attacks based on their existing rules.
III. BASIC IDEAS BEHIND THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The system model for the proposed hierarchical security
framework is shown in Fig. 2. In the proposed framework,
each node of a sensor network can performUCONand chance
discovery. The rules for these two modules are stored in
a combined rule set. Because the resources of sensors are
limited but the sinks and base station have rich computa-
tional resources and constant communication capabilities [5],
we define two levels of attack detection: (1) low level attack
detection in sensors, and (2) high level attack detection in
sinks and the base station.
FIGURE 2. The proposed hierarchical security framework.
High level attack detection requires relatively complex
rules based on data crystallization and can modify those rules
adaptively based on the threat situation. In contrast, the rules
of low level attack detection using KeyGraph are relatively
simple, and the rules are not updated adaptively.
A sensor will report unrecognized features to the sink if
any unknown events or attacks occur at the sensor. Based on
the high level rules, the sink or the base station will then
determine whether the events stem from an attacker or a
normal user. The sink or base station can change the rules
if necessary according to the novel attack features and return
a decision if the attack cannot be identified based on current
rules.
In addition, attack mitigations for sensors, sinks and the
base station are performed based on SDN and NFV.
IV. THE PROPOSED ATTACK DETECTION MECHANISM
A. REFERENCE MONITOR PROCESS OF UCON
A reference monitor (RM) is one of the most critical
issues when applying UCON for access enforcement.
ISO/IEC 10181-3 standard [26] has been proposed by the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), which
provides a framework for reference monitor access control.
Although the standard documentation (ISO/IEC101181-3)
for a usage control process explains the system’s basic behav-
iors, it lacks structure. To enhance the usage control model,
Statechart is used to model UCON as a reactive system. The
details are shown in Fig. 3.
FIGURE 3. The core UCON process.
In the usage control process, generating the try event causes
a usage process p to be initiated. At the start, any required
activities to begin the usage process are performed in the
requesting state. At the same time, the system generates the
request event. After the request event is called, based on
the access control policy, a preCheck state will be initiated by
the usage process p. Access control decisions are determined
at that point. When access is denied, the controller launches
any defined postUpdate activities. When access is granted,
the controller launches any defined preUpdate activities.
Meanwhile, the ready event will be generated.
B. KEYGRAPH BASED LOW LEVEL
ATTACK DETECTION IN SENSORS
There are several methods to realize chance discovery.
KeyGraph can extract key points of the data and map the
relations among them as an intuitionistic graph. The lines
between nodes in KeyGraph denote the relations among
the data and quantify the degree of tightness between
the objects. In this paper, we use KeyGraph to perform
chance discovery. First, assume that the original data set of
access features S consists of a sequence of sets, denoted as
s1, s2, . . . , sm, . . . , sn, where each set sm is a KeyGraph Gm.
Regarding time continuity, an access time is divided into
n parts, and each access decision must be provided and
selected on time. The graph Gm denotes the access process
from time tm to tm+1, where each vertex of the graph is a
feature data set of the access characteristics, and each edge
is a relation between two features. The iterations of chance
discovery can be performed as follows.
1) COMPUTATION OF CONNECTION VALUES OF KeyGraph
Vertexes in G can be sorted according to the frequencies of the
vertexes of the outer-edges in G. The association of vertexes
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in G∗, Ni and Nj in G∗, can be defined as
Connection(Ni,Nj) =
∑
sm∈D
∣∣Ni,Nj∣∣Gm (1)
where Ni and Nj are vertexes of Gm and
∣∣Ni,Nj∣∣ means the
time interval of a directed line from Ni to Nj present in
graph Gm, which corresponds to the feature Sm. Here, the
connection value can acts as an assessment of the tightness
between Ni and Nj. Pairs of vertexes in G∗ are identified and
sorted based on the connection values between them, which
can positively identify the relationship and tightness of a pair
of vertexes. A line directed in the opposite direction cannot be
added into G∗ because G∗ is a directed graph. In KeyGraph,
a connected sub-graph denotes a completed process of rule
construction, called a cluster or a foundation. Regarding the
hierarchical structure of G∗, for the senior node, the layer can
be computed as the layer of its junior plus one.
2) COMPUTATION OF TIGHTNESS
Security nodes in G∗ are presented as vertexes that connect
directly to the high-frequency terms of the cluster or founda-
tion. Here, the tightness of node N is defined as:
SecServN (N )
= 1−
∏
g⊂G∗
(1− KeyG(N , g)/AdjacServ(g)) (2)
where g is a foundation, and
KeyG(N , g) =
∑
sm∈D
WGm (N , g) (3)
AdjacServ(g) =
∑
sm∈D
∑
N∈Gm
WGm (N , g) (4)
WGm (N , g) =
∣∣NNg∣∣Gm × Layer(Ng)Ng∈g (5)
where the layer value of vertex Ng is denoted as Layer (Ng).
The key values are calculated for all the vertexes in Gm, and
the nodes with the top security factors will be added if they
are not in G∗.
KeyGraph iteration is performed using the principles stated
above.
3) DETECTION RULE CONSTRUCTION
In G∗,W (N , G∗) is the value that denotes featureN connected
to the key links around it. The feature nodes with values
beyond a reasonable threshold are treated as detection rules
that must be satisfied for attack detection; thus, a detection
rule can be constructed.
C. DATA CRYSTALLIZATION BASED HIGH LEVEL
ATTACK DETECTION IN BS AND SINK
KeyGraph is proposed for a given access data set, which
is usually used to find the underlying relations in the data
set. In other word, KeyGraph can find important chances
with a low frequency of occurrence. However, KeyGraph
can only address known features of a data set; it cannot
address unknown data sets. In fact, when an unknown attack
presents itself, KeyGraph based intrusion detection alone
cannot detect it accurately. However, a data crystallization
algorithm can address the problem of unknown data andmake
accurate decisions. Using this method, unknown data can
be detected based on the analysis of known data. Here, we
use data crystallization [27] to perform high level intrusion
detection, in particular, for detecting unknown attacks. The
process of data crystallization based attack detection is shown
in Fig. 4.
In this high level intrusion detection scheme, KeyGraph
is still used for computing the unknown data set. A rough
KeyGraph can be obtained, and the ‘‘virtualized item’’ that
is related to the unknown data can be added into KeyGraph
as a vertex. Next, the relationships between this ‘‘virtualized
item’’ and existing vertexes can be established. In other
words, by inserting unknown data into the known data, their
relationships can be obtained. Isolated vertexes from the
KeyGraph can be connected in the KeyGraph by inserting
them iteratively as ‘‘virtualized items.’’
For normal access, assume that µ is the mean of the leaf
node features vector, and S is the covariance matrix of the
same feature vector. Additionally, for the current KeyGraph,
assume that θ is a matrix of the feature data of a novel attack.
Assume that the covariance matrix of the same feature vector
is denoted as H .
Next, based on the calculation of the Mahalanobis-
distance, virtual items should be added into the original data
set. The Mahalanobis-distance can be calculated based on the
following formula:
dM =
√
(θ − µ)T · H−1 · (θ − µ) (6)
where the minimum Mahalanobis-distance is the thresh-
old LT , which is the distance from the usual known attack
vertex to the normal access central vertex.
After adding the virtual items, the KeyGraph can be recon-
structed. When the iteration is finished, the added items
should be confirmed by the existing attack data set, which
can optimize the KeyGraph. Using this process, the virtual
item will be removed if it cannot match the existing attack
data set. Finally, based on the final KeyGraph, the results can
be obtained.
V. ATTACK MITIGATION MECHANISM
A. SECURITY ASSESSMENT BASED ON EVIDENCE
The principle of evidence-driven security assessment based
on SDN and NFV is shown in Fig. 5.
Using this mechanism, an SDN controller collects topol-
ogy and vulnerability information instantly. The information
mainly includes network nodes, connectivity and vulnerabil-
ities that lie in the network nodes. It is easy for the SDN-MN
controller to do this job because of its central control role in
the network.
Then, the SDN controller generates an attack graph with
the current probabilities.
Traditional network defense appliances and NFV-based
network defense appliances detect real-time security events
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FIGURE 4. The process of data crystallization based attack detection.
FIGURE 5. Evidence-driven security assessment using SDN-MN factors
and NFV-based detection.
in the network and send them to the SDN controller. Then, the
SDN controller measures the current security level driven by
this evidence using the algorithms of evidence-driven security
assessment discussed in a later section.
Using this procedure, an attack graph with new probabili-
ties is generated that can denote the current security level of
the network.
B. PROPOSED ATTACK GRAPH
In a later section, we use the attack graph as a method to
measure the static network security level, defined as follows:
Definition 1: A network attack graph is a 7-tuple directed
acyclic graph AG = (S, S0,G,A,E,1,8), where:
• A finite set of state nodes is denoted as
S = {si|i = 1, . . . ,Ns}.
• A set of the state the attacker wishes to take over is
denoted as S0 ⊆ S.
• The purpose of the attack is denoted as G ⊆ S.
• A finite set of actions is denoted as A = {ai|i =
1, . . . ,Na}.
• A finite set of edges is denoted as E = (E1 ∪ E2).
Pre(n) and Con(n) denote the prerequisite nodes and the
consequent nodes, respectively.
• A local conditional probability distribution that provides
an estimate of whether a given action will be conducted
is denoted as 1 = {δ : (Pre (ai) , ai)→ [0, 1]}.
• A local conditional probability distribution that provides
an estimate of whether an access is legal can be used,
denoted as 8 = {∅ : (ai,Con (ai))→ [0, 1]}.
Figure 6 shows a typical attack graph for WSNs.
FIGURE 6. A typical network attack graph.
1) LOCAL CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION OF STATE NODE
A local conditional probability distribution function of si,
which is mathematically equivalent to Pr(si|Pre(si)),
is defined as follows:
1. for AND decomposition:
Pr(si|Pre(si)) = Pr(∩aj) (7)
where aj = Pre(si), and
2. for OR decomposition:
Pre(si) = Pr(∪aj) (8)
where aj = Pre(si).
2) LOCAL CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ACTION NODE
In mathematics, a local conditional probability distribution
function of ai that is equivalent to Pr(ai|Pre(ai)) can be
defined as shown in the following formulas:
1. for AND decomposition
Pr(ai|Pre(ai)) = Pr(∩sj) (9)
where sj = Pre(ai), and
2. for OR decomposition
Pr(ai|Pre(ai)) = Pr(∪sj) (10)
where sj = Pre(ai).
C. MECHANISM OF ATTACK MITIGATION
USING SDN AND NFV
The mechanism of attack mitigation using SDN control and
NFV deployment is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Based on the attack graph driven by evidence as mentioned
earlier, the SDN controller inspects all the VNFs that have
already been registered and determines an attack mitigation
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FIGURE 7. Mechanism of attack mitigation using SDN-MN control and
NFV deployment.
plan for the current situation that obeys a pre-defined security
policy. The algorithms that determine the attack mitigation
plan are discussed later.
The SDN controller obtains the attack mitigation plan and
installs the VNF instances into the selected network nodes.
VNFs can be deployed as binary compiled code or as inter-
preted language scripts.
When these steps are complete, the mobile net-
work can defend against the threat and attain a secure
status.
D. ATTACK MITIGATION SCHEME
Definition 2: Let mi(pi, cost i) be an attack mitigation control
for action ai and pi be a factor that decreases the probability of
the success of ai. Here, cost i is the resource cost of deploying
the attack mitigation control. Then,
Pr(aj|mi) = Pr
(
aj
)×pi (11)
In our paper, the goal of an attack mitigation plan is to
deploy sufficient attack mitigation controls so that all the
probabilities of reaching a target in the attack graph are below
a certain threshold and at the same time, to hold the cost
for deploying the attack mitigation controls to the minimum
value in all mitigation plans.
Definition 3: Let M = {mi|i = 1, . . . ,Na} be the attack
mitigation controls for the actions A = {ai|i = 1, . . . ,Na.
A Boolean vector T = {ti|i = 1, . . . ,Na} is used to present
the attack mitigation plan, where ti = True means that mi
is adopted in the plan, and ti = False means that mi is not
adopted in the plan.
Suppose there are p paths for a target in the attack
graph, and T is the attack mitigation plan. The maximum
value allowed after performing the attack mitigation plan is
Threshold . Then, the probability of a successful attack for the
ith path is Pi(T ), and the total cost for the attack mitigation
plan T is Cost(T ).
To reach the goals of an attack mitigation plan, the values
must obey the policy
Pi(T ) ≤ Threshold, i = 1, . . . ., p (12)
This is equal to
Gi (T ) = Pi (T )− Threshold ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ., p (13)
And the following formula can be calculated:
minimize Cost(T ). (14)
VI. ATTACK EXPERIMENT
To obtain the data set for evaluation, an attack experiment
was performed. The WSNs are connected through Wi-Fi for
the experiment because many existing real-world WSNs use
Wi-Fi technologies [28]. The membership-based metered
payment policy [29] is used as a case policy for the
experiment.
To set up the feature data set for attack detection, we
combined UCON and Wi-Fi wireless traffic features [30].
First, some important features of UCON are selected based on
the feature selectionmethod in [31]. Second, theMAC header
field is extracted as the Wi-Fi standard [30]. To determine the
relevance of each feature, Information Gain Ratio (IGR) [32]
is used as a measure. The features of UCON are shown in
Table 1, and the features ofWi-Fi traffic are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 1. Features of access control.
TABLE 2. Features of wireless traffic.
WSNs were deployed over three wireless stations for this
experiment. One station functioned as a server node. Another
station was used to generate normal and attack traffic. The
last machine was deployed to monitor and record both nor-
mal and attack traffic. Attacks were generated based on
Backtrack [34].
VII. EVALUATION
A. RESOURCE CONSUMPTION
In WSNs, the sink and base station usually have powerful
resources, but resources at the sensors are limited. There-
fore, the resource consumption of the proposed scheme (time
and memory) in sensors is very important. To perform the
evaluation, our scheme was implemented based on TinyOS.
We tested it by deploying Tossim. Please note that Tossim
simulates MicaZ.
The time overhead required by our scheme is shown
in Fig. 8. The time overhead is the average time span between
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FIGURE 8. Time consumption.
the time a sensor receives a request and when it makes a local
detection decision. The time overhead of the methods used
in [6] and [11] were tested for comparison. In Fig. 7, the
vertical coordinates denote the time overhead required for
detection. The four groups of columns denote four cases that
correspond to four types of attacks including APR replay,
forgery, Denial of Service (DoS) and ongoing dictionary
attacks. For APR replay, forgery, and DoS attacks, 300 items
from a training data set and 300 items from the test data
set were used to evaluate each attack. However, the ongoing
dictionary attack type was not in the training set, and only
300 items of test data were available; therefore, this can
be regarded as a type of attack with ongoing and unknown
features. As shown in Fig. 8, the time overhead required
by our scheme is much lower than that of the schemes
in [6] and [11], especially for the ongoing dictionary attack.
Storing the proposed scheme will of course require
memory consumption. As shown in Fig. 9, as a rule, the
memory consumption required by our scheme is lower than
when the rules of UCON and attack detection are separate,
which shows that our scheme has advantages in memory
consumption.
FIGURE 9. Memory consumption.
B. ATTACK DETECTION CAPABILITY
We use these metrics to evaluate the system: the detection
rate δ evaluates the overall attack detection performance,
which is formally defined by
δ = x/n (15)
where x is the number of attacks that are detected, and n is
the total number of attacks that actually occur.
By using the discrete event system specification (DEVS)
Formalism [35], an attack detection simulation was per-
formed to serve as a platform for evaluation. The chance
discovery was constructed based on the training data set
containing the four types of attacks previously described. The
detection rate of our scheme as well as detection rates for the
schemes in [6] and [11] are shown in Fig. 10. In that figure,
the detection rate of the proposed scheme is obviously higher
than that of the more typical compared schemes, especially
for unknown ongoing dictionary attacks. This is because the
cooperation between the low level attack detection and high
level attack detection.
FIGURE 10. Attack detection rate.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
For WSNs in smart cities, ongoing attacks with mutable
attributes and unknown attacks with novel features are
sophisticated persistent threats that disturb the normal func-
tions of WSNs. In this paper, we propose a hierarchical
framework using UCON and chance discovery, which has
low-complexity for resource-restrained sensors and high-
complexity for sinks or the base station. In this framework,
usage control (UCON), which is capable of continuous
decision making, is used to address the ongoing attacks.
On the other hand, to defend against unknown attacks, we
develop an adaptive chance discovery mechanism for attack
detection. Moreover, we use SDN and NFV to perform the
attack mitigation. The results of the attack experiment and
simulations show that our scheme is both feasible for WSNs
and offers a significant improvement over current attack
detection accuracy.
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